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A B S T R A C T   
In recent years, the global increase in security concerns made it 
inevitable to develop new action plans in planning processes. Security 
concerns come with the necessity of considering building architecture 
processes together with environmental and landscape design 
processes. This study aims identification of which measures can be taken 
into account safely built environment design. It was made a safety 
checklist which can be adapted for every open spaces. Five shopping 
malls around the İstanbul were evaluated and some result have been 
achieved for their site security. 
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1. Introduction  
The security issue plays an important role in 
making urban design decisions and determining 
quality of life criteria. Security is ranked after 
physiological and biological needs in the 
hierarchy of vital needs of human beings 
(Maslow, 1943). Presence of other people 
makes one feel safer (the concept of “eyes on 
the street”: the more people, the safer the 
environment is) (Jacobs, 1961), and people 
living in the city need safe environments in their 
daily life cycle. Project for Public Space, and the 
studies carried out by Lang, Gehl and Turkoglu, 
which emphasize the importance of safety and 
trust for the space quality and healthy cities, are 
important (Lang, 1994; URL 1, Gehl, 2002; URL 2). 
Positive security perception enhances the urban 
senses of belonging and ownership. 
Improvement of social, economic and cultural 
living conditions besides the improvement of the 
design conditions of the physical environments 
influences the perception of positive security 
(Bal, 2012). Using durable materials such as steel 
and concrete in urban furniture, expanding the 
coverage of pedestrian zones, providing dense 
afforestation, constructing barriers, distributing 
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transfer points of public transportation to 
multiple locations, and limiting vehicle access to 
the city center are important actions within the 
scope of the mentioned action plans (URL 3). 
In urban outdoor designing, safe physical 
planning is important for being able to provide 
people with psychological comfort. Security 
planning requires considering the building’s 
location in the city, its position on the land, its 
form, landscape design, car park and 
infrastructure facilities as well as the pedestrian 
and vehicle access as a whole. In addition to 
planning studies, security design of the building 
perimeter also includes the efforts to restrain the 
sources of unwanted external threats by means 
of artificial or natural restrictive means such as 
walls and fences. This kind of security restrictions 
are intended for keeping potential threat 
elements away from buildings. Despite all 
precautions, there may still be a risk of danger 
due to physical factors as well as budget and 
personnel restrictions (Hopper and Droge, 2005). 
Today, building perimeter security is an issue that 
concerns all buildings. This study examines the 
security of shopping centers and their 
perimeters, as environments with intensive 
human use that city-dwellers use to carry out 
their social, cultural and economic activities. 
According to the definition of the International 
Council of Shopping Centers (ICSC); “shopping 
centers are public commercial buildings 
covering a minimum gross leasable area (GLA) 
of 5,000 square meters and at least 15 
independent departments, which are 
managed as a single entity. The terrorism threat 
in commercial shopping centers is an important 
source of concern due to the fact that 21 
countries have had more than 60 terrorist 
attacks since 1998. According to the analysis 
results of the statistical data about these 
attacks, 17 of the terrorist attacks were carried 
out around and outside the shopping centers; 
and therefore, security planning is needed for 
the outdoor spaces of such public buildings 
(Figure 1) (LaTourrette et al., 2006, URL-2). The 
same concerns are shared in Turkey as well, 
regarding the modern shopping center 
buildings taking the place of traditional 
shopping centers, the number of which 
reached 299 in consequence of the increase in 
their number, experienced especially after the 
1980s. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Images of damaged shopping center surroundings: 
Harrods; Corporation Street: Manchester; Karrada: Bagdad 
(URL 4) 
 
The result of the investigation made within the 
scope of this study, on the laws and regulations 
applicable for building construction processes in 
our country, showed that no application 
provision and design criteria for site or urban 
security has been included in legislations, apart 
from several laws and regulations such as 
Construction Zoning Law No.194 enacted in 
1985, the Regulation on Occupational Health 
and Safety in Constructional Works enacted in 
2012, the Regulation on Making Spatial Plans 
enacted in 2014, and the Regulation on 
Shopping Centers enacted in 2014 (URL 5). 
 
At this point, it is important to define site security 
of shopping centers besides security of all urban 
buildings, and establish their legal regulations as 
well as their planning and design standards. In 
this study, it is intended to define appropriate 
site planning principles by establishing standards 
for site security design. 
 
2. Method Of The Study 
In this study, an effort is made to form a checklist 
intended for measuring the security design 
processes of building perimeters. The checklist 
titles were taken by the American Society of 
Landscape Architects (ASLA) from the “Security 
Design and Landscape Architecture” titled 
study of the Landscape Architecture Technical 
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Information Series/LATIS, and the “Risk 
Management Series” titled study of the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency/FEMA (LATIS, 
2016; FEMA, 2003, 2007). This checklist created 
basically for building perimeters was applied to 
five shopping centers in Istanbul. The 
measurement values of the control list were 
determined based on the results of a literature 
review. Afterwards, data were collected for 
each shopping center by carrying out field 
studies including on-site monitoring, 
observations and project analyses. Among the 
indicators considered to be potentially have an 
effect on the site security process, those 
considered to have a positive contribution were 
scored 1, whereas those considered to have a 
negative contribution were scored 0 during the 
formation of the checklist. In consequence of 
the study, the buildings thought to be relatively 
well protected were described. 
 
3. Concepts About Building Perimeter Security 
In security planning, minimizing the losses of life 
as much as possible will be the main objective 
that can be achieved by creating a detailed 
and integrative security program during the 
early stages of the site selection and/or design 
process. Proximity to risky buildings will require 
additional precautions in site planning. Other 
issues such as site selection, orientation of 
buildings, retraction distance, entrance control, 
activity areas and infrastructure deployment 
should be considered in the early stage of the 
design development process. A building 
structure deployed in a dispersed formation can 
protect the building from getting damaged 
completely during an attack. If the elevation of 
a building is higher than that of the street, it will 
enhance its security. Proximity to important 
transportation routes such as railroads, 
watercourses, highways etc. as well as the 
existing infrastructure elements such as tunnels 
should be evaluated because buildings may be 
subjected to terrorist attacks through these 
(LATIS, 2016; Russ, 2002, s.320). 
 
Standoff Distance in Risk Analysis 
Standoff distance can be defined as the 
distance between the building and the nearest 
point, where there may be an unauthorized 
vehicle access. A longer standoff distance will 
provide better protection (Figure 2) (National 
Capital Authority, 2003, p.7).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Defense layers; Up: Single building perimeter, 
Down: Plaza. Perimeter boundary (Site property boundary) 
determines the security distance around the building that 
can be uncontrollable for the owner of the building and the 
people living there (FEMA, 2003) 
 
Security zones in risk analysis 
Security zones between the building and streets 
can be defined as building perimeter, 
border/pedestrian path, border and parking 
zones (Figure 3). Measures are usually taken in 
the building perimeter and the 
border/pedestrian zones. 
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Figure 3. Up: security zones (National Capital Authority, 2003, 
p.7); middlel: building perimeter zone; down: 
border/pedestrian zone (National Capital Authority, 2003, 
p.9). 
 
Security analysis includes the situation 
assessment of the site perimeter and outside the 
site. Topography, vegetation, adjacent land 
uses, fields of vision, storage areas, locations of 
the infrastructure facilities, existing lighting 
elements, service vehicles, entrance points for 
the personnel, and access and circulation 
system for visitors are the issues important in 
planning (The American Institute of Architects 
and Demkin, 2003, p.44). 
 
Topography 
The presence of natural physical barriers such as 
water elements, dense vegetation, and uneven 
terrain can be helpful for providing access 
control and consequently for ensuring the 
security of the site (Figure  4, 5). 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Security protection has been designed in harmony 
with the architectural identity of the building. The Federal 
Complex containing the three iconic buildings of Mies van 
der Rohe and the statue of Alexander Calder (Chicago, 
Illinois) (Photo General services administration by teng and 
associates, Chicago) (FEMA, 2007). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. The Minneapolis courthouse plaza. Small lawn hills 
and logs prevent possible vehicle attacks along the facade 
of the building (FEMA, 2007) 
 
Vehicle and pedestrian access 
The number of vehicle entrance points should 
be low as much as possible. The size of the 
adjacent streets and the traffic will determine 
the vehicle entrance points. Ensuring an 
adequate retraction distance along the 
entrance of the building will be effective 
particularly in controlling the access for vehicles. 
(LATIS, 2016; FEMA 2003). 
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Car park 
Parking spaces should be away from the 
building, and should be controllable by the 
security staff (Russ, 2002, p.321). Underground 
car parks are highly risky in terms of potential 
bomb attacks, and they require high security 
control. Where possible, they should be 
designed to remain outside the building (LATIS, 
2016).   
 
Seating Elements 
Open spaces with seating elements should be 
formed around the building (FEMA, 2007). 
Benches planned together with plant pots, 
bollards and other urban furniture can be used 
in security control in intensively use areas around 
the building. If the benches will be placed on 
the sidewalk zone, they should be positioned in 
such a way as to ensure that they face the street 
and the building, and if they will be placed in 
the building zone, they should face the street. 
The presence of benches can provide control 
against unwanted activities, by providing 
opportunities for natural monitoring of the 
environment (Phifer, 2005; American Planning 
Association, Steiner, Butler, 2006; Russ, 2002, 
p.319). 
 
 Landscape Design 
Land forms, water features, vegetation, 
inclination differences in floor areas, boundaries, 
urban furniture series, bollards, benches, 
flagpoles, and sales units can play a role in 
limiting the access to the site and controlling the 
pedestrian and traffic flows. They should be 
placed in such a way not to hinder emergency 
vehicle entrances, pedestrian flow and 
pedestrian access. The use of thorny and sharp-
leaved plants (Scarlet Firethorn-Pyracantha, 
Chandelier, Spanish dagger-Yucca gloriosa, 
Pampas grass-Cortaderia selloana, etc.) around 
the building can create a natural barrier (FEMA, 
2007). 
 
Physical Protective Borders 
Physical protective boundaries can create 
permanent boundaries around the site, by 
helping in limiting, directing or blocking the 
access. In addition to their physical 
effectiveness, protective boundaries also 
provide a psychological deterrence against 
those who plan an unauthorized access 
attempt. Water elements, changes in the 
topography, vegetation, and outdoor furniture 
such as fences, walls, bollards, and fountains 
can provide protection by creating borders 
(FEMA, 2003). Crash-proof vehicle barriers 
prevent vehicle access for pedestrian 
protection and building security. Walls, berms, 
plant pots, bollards, heavy elements, reinforced 
urban furniture and trees, water barriers, fences, 
and sculptural restrictive elements can prevent 
vehicles from posing a threat to the building 
(Figure 7) (FEMA, 2007). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Up: sculptural forms, furniture and bollards serving 
as restrictive elements. San Francisco Federal Building 
(FEMA, 2007); middle: Times Square Tower, down: Wall Street, 
New York City, Rogers Marvel Architects (Phifer, 2005; FEMA, 
2007) 
 
Signing 
Signing required to be designed correctly and 
adequately so as to avoid disorders at the 
transportation, car parks and entrance points 
should be located outside the site and in the 
entrances, and should not be used in sensitive 
areas as unless it is required (FEMA, 2003.) 
 
 Lighting 
43 lux (= 4horizontal foot-candles) on average 
will be adequate to provide proper lighting at 
the entrance control points (FEMA, 2003). 
Security lighting that enhances natural 
surveillance for security staff and users is  
intended to ensure regular lighting in vehicular 
and pedestrian roads, and to protect people 
and the building perimeter. Security lighting 
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provides physical and psychological 
deterrence. Lighting elements with high poles 
provides a wider and more natural light 
distribution. They are aesthetically preferred 
over standard lighting elements (American 
Planning Association, Steiner, Butler, 2006, p. 275; 
Hopper, 2007, p.80, Bulla, 2004). 
 
Infrastructure Systems 
Infrastructure systems may be significantly 
damaged after an explosion. Besides 
constituting physical damages in the building, 
they may also prevent the evacuation of 
wounded people. Therefore, the landscape 
architect should be careful when working on 
the infrastructure facility. Where possible, 
substructure facilities such as telephone, 
electricity, gas and water installations etc. 
should be placed under ground. The fire safety 
lines should be well defined, and the water 
distribution system as well as the fire hydrants 
should be in a visible place (FEMA, 2007). Care 
should be taken to abstain from signing critical 
infrastructure elements as long as it is not 
necessary. When hazardous materials such as 
oil, gas and other chemicals are required to be 
stored, they should be placed downwards on 
the slope, at least 30.5 m away from the 
buildings. Garbage cans should be designed to 
be located 9.14 m meters away from the 
building, and car parks and vehicle roads 
should be designed to be at least 15.24 m away 
from the critical infrastructure systems. 
 
4. Analyses of Sample Sites 
4.1 Analyses of Building Perimeters: See the Table 1. 
  Table 1. Analyses of Building Perimeters
R
IS
K
 A
N
A
LY
S
IS
 
NUMBER 1 NUMBER 2 NUMBER 3 NUMBER 4 NUMBER 5 
Standoff distance (Figure 7) 
Adequate 
 
Inadequate 
 
Inadequate 
 
Adequate 
 
Adequate 
 
Figure 7. 1,2,3,4,5 
Security zone (Figure 8) 
Adequate 
 
 
 
 
 
Security zone with 
retaining walls 
consisting of curbs 
and slopes, and with 
seaward terraces. 
 
No physical security 
measure is available 
at its entrance 
points. 
 
 
Adequate 
 
 
 
 
 
Adequate 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8. 1,2,3,4,5 
TO
P
O
G
R
A
P
H
Y
 
The presence of natural physical barriers at the entrances (Figure 9) 
Statue 
 
 
 
Statues and water 
features are not 
available 
 
Water feature 
 
 
 
Statues and water 
features are not 
available 
 
Statue 
 
 
 
Figure 9. 1,2,3,4,5 
Dense vegetation Dense vegetation Dense vegetation is 
unavailable 
Dense vegetation Dense vegetation 
Stairs are 
available 
Stairs are unavailable Stairs are unavailable Stairs are available Stairs are unavailable 
Land Inclination (Figure 10) 
Sloping terrain 
 
Rugged terrain 
 
Flat terrain 
 
Sloping terrain 
 
Sloping terrain 
 
Figure 10. 1,2,3,4,5 
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V
E
H
IC
U
LA
R
 A
N
D
 P
E
D
E
S
TR
IA
N
 A
C
C
E
S
S
 The presence of 
traffic signs and 
lights, and the 
drivers reducing 
the speeds of their 
vehicles by 
paying attention 
to the warnings. 
 
 
 
 
The chaos caused by 
the pedestrians and 
vehicles while 
accessing the main 
place from the 
coastal road. The 
traffic density at the 
main entrance 
caused by the valets 
providing VIP service 
for visitors. 
 
Unavailability of an 
arrangement in front 
of the main entrance 
gate of the building, 
and the hindered 
pedestrian access 
experienced 
especially during 
rush hours due to 
vehicles parked in 
front of the building. 
 
Ease of access from 
all directions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Four different access 
points for pedestrians, 
and eight for vehicles 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11. 1,2,3,4,5 
C
A
R
 P
A
R
K
 
A parking garage 
and a parking lot 
at the back of the 
building. 
 
 
Parking garage 
 
 
 
 
 
A parking garage 
and an uncontrolled 
parking lot 
 
 
 
A parking garage 
with three different 
entrances and exits, 
and a parking lot 
for LPG vehicles 
 
One is a parking lot 
for service and 
warehouse vehicles, 
and the other is for 
general use 
 
Figure 12. 1,2,3,4,5 
S
E
A
TI
N
G
 E
LE
M
E
N
TS
 
Around the 
secondary 
entrance of the 
building and in 
the cafeterias 
located in the 
vicinity of the 
main entrance. 
 
Around the building 
and in the cafeterias 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No seating element 
is available 
Seating elements 
facing inside the 
courtyard in the 
main entrance 
square 
 
 
 
 
Sitting areas on the 
right and left of the 
main entrance, 
located in parallel to 
the sidewalks; 
designed together 
with cafes, shops and 
parking spaces 
 
Figure 13. 1,2,4,5 
V
E
G
E
TA
TI
O
N
 
Vegetation that 
does not close the 
building perimeter 
 
 
 
 
Terrace landscape 
application 
extending from the 
seaside 
 
 
 
Green band at the 
right and left of the 
road heading only 
from the main 
entrance gate to the 
parking lot. 
 
Inadequate 
vegetation with 
plant pots 
 
 
 
 
Plantation distributed 
around the building 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14. 1,2,3,4,5 
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P
H
Y
S
IC
A
L 
P
R
O
TE
C
TI
V
E
 B
O
R
D
E
R
S
 
Urban furniture 
and plant walls 
formed with the 
land slope at the 
main entrance. A 
separative wall 
and fence at the 
entrance of the 
parking garage 
that constitutes 
the boundary 
between the 
house and the 
shopping center  
 
Seaward terraces 
with plants, heavy 
plant pots placed 
along the perimeter 
of the entrance, and 
a fence determining 
the boundaries of the 
property. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
There is no physical 
protector or 
restrictive element 
apart from the split 
road formed for 
valets at the main 
entrance, and the 
green band 
between the main 
road and the 
shopping center at 
the side facing the 
airport. 
 
 
Restriction with 
vegetation, 
concrete blocks, 
stairs and ramps 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sidewalks, design 
elements on the 
sidewalks, and the 
walls intended for 
security and 
restriction. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15. 1,2,3,4,5 
S
IG
N
IN
G
 
Direction sign (for 
transportation 
and parking) 
 
 
 
Simple portable 
traffic cones and 
signs placed in the 
direction of the 
parking lot entrance. 
 
Signing only for the 
car park area 
 
 
 
 
Symbols and signs 
intended for only 
emergency 
situations 
 
 
No direction signs for 
vehicles’ access to 
the parking lot, signs 
for access to the 
building entrance. 
 
Figure 16. 1,2,3,4,5 
Adequate lighting 
except for the 
lighting on the 
road to the car 
park. The light on 
the building, 
cafeteria and 
outside wall that 
comes from the 
street. 
 
Inadequate lighting 
and dark areas in the 
front entrance. 
Stronger lighting 
systems on the sea 
side. 
 
 
 
 
 
The facade parallel 
to the motor way is 
lighter. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Additional lighting 
coming from the 
street, and lighting 
elements placed at 
certain intervals in 
the landscaping 
areas outside the 
building. 
 
 
 
Lighting and lighting 
poles at the main 
entrance, and small 
lighting elements 
intended for 
landscaping. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 17. 1,2,3,4,5 
IN
FR
A
S
TR
U
C
TU
R
E
 
FA
C
IL
IT
IE
S
 
Placed under 
ground 
Fire hydrant around 
the building 
 
 
Placed under 
ground 
Fire hydrant around 
the building 
 
 
Water distribution 
mechanism and fire 
hydrants near the 
building 
Figure 18. 2, 4,5 
 
4.2. Checklist Evaluations 
While forming the checklist about building 
perimeter security, we first investigated certain 
subjects such as closeness to the risky areas 
related to the building layout plan, building’s 
form, building’s location and retraction 
distance, security zones around the building, 
entrance control points, and building’s 
closeness to important motorways; then  
 
analyzed the topography covering the subject 
of BUILDING PERIMETER LANDSCAPING, 
vehicular and pedestrian use, car park, seating 
elements, vegetation, lighting, garbage cans, 
as well as the indicators of the infrastructure 
systems subjected to a detailed examination in 
Table 1, and ultimately obtained the results 
shown in Table 2. 
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  Table 2. Score Analysis of Shopping Centers (LATIS, 2016; FEMA, 2007; FEMA, 2003) 
 1 2 3 4 5 
General Subjects      
Closeness to risky areas. close 0, not close 1 1 1 0 0 1 
Is the building form is in a dispersed formation? yes 1, no 0 1 1 1 1 1 
Has the building a retraction distance? yes 1, no 0 1 1 1 1 1 
Has it security zones? yes 1, no 0 1 1 0 1 1 
Is the access control adequate? adequate 1, inadequate 0 1 0 0 1 1 
Is the building positioned higher than the street elevation? yes 1, no 0 1 0 0 1 0 
Is it close to the railroad? not close 1, close 0 1 1 1 0 1 
Is it close to the highway? not close 1, close 0 1 0 0 1 1 
Is there a substructure facility? yes 0, no 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Topography      
presence of natural physical barriers (water, dense vegetation, 
rough terrain etc.) 
     
stairs are available 1, unavailable 0 1 0 0 1 0 
dense vegetation is available 1, unavailable 0 1 1 0 1 1 
rough terrain is available 1, unavailable 0 1 1 0 1 1 
Vehicular and Pedestrian Access is adequate 1, inadequate 0 1 0 1 1 1 
The number of vehicle entries is limited 1, excessively high 0 1 1 1 0 0 
Car park      
Security staff is available 1, unavailable 0 1 1 0 1 1 
Underground car park is available 0, unavailable 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Available outside the building 1, unavailable 0 1 1 1 1 1 
Seating Elements      
Seating elements facing the street are available 1, unavailable 0 1 1 0 0 1 
Seating elements facing the building are available 1, unavailable 0 0 1 0 1 1 
Planting Design      
Vegetation that does not eliminate the visibility of the building 
perimeter is available 1, unavailable 0 
1 1 1 1 1 
Physical Protective Borders      
Water features are available around the building  
available 1, unavailable 0 
1 0 1 0 1 
Physical restriction (wall) is available 1, unavailable 0 1 1 0 1 1 
Bollards are available 1, unavailable 0 1 1 1 1 1 
Vehicle barriers are available 1, unavailable 0 1 1 1 1 1 
Surface mounted plant pots  are available 1, unavailable 0 0 1 0 1 0 
Signing is adequate 1, inadequate 0 1 1 0 0 0 
Is the parking space obvious? obvious 1, not obvious 0 1 1 0 1 1 
Is the entrance point obvious? obvious 1, not obvious 0 1 1 1 1 1 
Lighting      
Adequate entrance-control lighting is available 1, unavailable 0 1 0 0 1 1 
Adequate car park lighting is available 1, unavailable 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Adequate pedestrian path lighting is available 1, unavailable 0 0 1 0 1 1 
High lighting is available 1, unavailable 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Are the garbage cans away from the building? yes 1, no 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Infrastructure Systems      
Are the fire hydrants apparent? yes 1, no 0 0 1 0 1 1 
                                                                                                    Total 26 22 12 26 27 
 
5. Conclusion 
A good security design involving technology, 
operational activities and operational processes 
is intended for protecting the building against  
existing and potential hazards (Hopper, Droge,  
2005). In order to ensure an adequate level of 
protection, precautions should begin to be 
taken before the construction stage of the 
building, when taking design decisions related 
to the building. Particularly the terrain 
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topography should be well analyzed and the 
zones that will protect the building and the 
surrounding area should be formed during the 
site planning process. Ensuring an effective 
security protection requires arrangements and 
precautions related to the vehicular and 
pedestrian roads, car park locations, seating 
elements, vegetation, restrictions, signing, 
lighting, and infrastructure facilities. Well-
maintained and well-illuminated areas 
protected by an adequate number of security 
personnel can play a role in preventing 
unwanted activities. An effective control can 
also be ensured through natural surveillance of 
people around the building. In the evaluation of 
the checklist created in accordance with these 
criteria; it was concluded that the site security 
qualities of the shopping centers 5, 1, 4, and 2 
(respectively) were higher than that of the 
shopping center 3. Although the research results 
are not definite, they have a nature that can 
give information about outdoor security, 
including the subjects of constructional and 
vegetal landscape design of building 
perimeters. At this point, this study will have the 
nature of being a source that paves the way for 
analyzing the site security qualities of other 
building perimeters and the existing shopping 
centers, and for carrying out precautionary and 
revisionary studies intended for the future. 
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